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The Act of State Doctrine: A Shield For
Bribery And Corruption
Clayco Petroleum Corporation v. Occidental Petroleum
Corporation, 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983)
In 1979, the Board of Directors of Occidental Petroleum Cor-
poration (Occidental) published a report admitting that Occidental
had made a number of illegal overseas payments.' Clayco Petro-
leum Corporation (Clayco) subsequently filed an antitrust action in
the United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia against Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Occidental of Umm
Al Qaywayn, Inc. and Armand Hammer. Clayco alleged that by
making secret payments to Sheikh Sultan bin Ahmed Muallah, the
Petroleum Minister and son of the ruler Umm Al Qaywayn, Occi-
dental had unlawfully secured an off-shore oil concession previ-
ously promised to Clayco.3 The district court granted Occidental's
motion to dismiss on the ground that an adjudication of the case
was barred by the act of state doctrine. The court reasoned that if
Clayco were allowed to sustain the proof of its claim, a review of
the sovereign's involvement in the granting of the oil concession
would have been required. In the court's view, this would have re-
sulted in unwarranted judicial interference with United States for-
eign policy. The court also refused to apply a commercial exception
to the act of state doctrine.
Clayco's appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit asserted that the district court erred in dismissing
the complaint because of the act of state doctrine. On appeal, the
1. The report had been prepared upon the directive of the Securities Exchange Com-
mission following commencement of an action alleging violations of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., No. 77-
0751 (D.D.C. filed May 3, 1977). The report revealed that a questionable $200,000 payment
had been made in Switzerland and inaccurately entered on Occidental's books.
2. This former sheikdom now constitutes part of the United Arab Emirates. In Occi-
dental Petroleum Corporation v. Buttes Gas & Oil Company, 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal.
1971), the court concluded that Umm Al Qaywayn was a state for purposes of the act of
state doctrine.
3. Clayco claimed violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, section
2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(c), section 16720 and 17046 of the Califor-
nia Business and Professions Code, and the common law.
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Court of Appeals held, affirmed: Where allegations of bribery and
conspiracy implicated the exercise of power peculiar to a sovereign,
the act of state doctrine required dismissal of the complaint; no
exceptions based on the commercial activity of the sovereign or the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 could be invoked. Clayco
Petroleum Corporation v. Occidental Petroleum Corporation, 712
F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983).
The act of state doctrine is a principle of self-imposed judicial
restraint in the adjudication of cases involving politically-sensitive
foreign policy. Its underlying purpose is to preclude judicial pro-
nouncements that might embarrass the Executive branch or a for-
eign sovereign and undermine favorable United States relations
with foreign governments.
Ever since Underhill v. Hernandez,4 courts have been grap-
pling, oftimes unsatisfactorily, with both analysis and application
of the act of the state doctrine. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino,5 a case involving the expropriation of American property in
Cuba by the Castro government, the Supreme Court recognized
that the doctrine had "constitutional underpinnings," but rejected
the argument that it was constitutionally mandated by the princi-
ple of separation of powers. e Instead, the Court advocated use of a
balancing test to determine whether a foreign affairs issue was so
politically sensitive that judicial abstention was warranted.7 In
Sabbatino, however, the Court failed to identify which factors
should be balanced, thereby providing little guidance for the adju-
dication df future litigation involving the act of state doctrine.
The problem has been further exacerbated by the burgeoning
incursion of the doctrine into the antitrust action domain. In Hunt
v. Mobil Oil Corporation, for example, the doctrine was applied as
a jurisdictional bar to adjudication of an antitrust claim. Although
the foreign sovereign was neither named as a defendant nor impli-
cated in the alleged conspiracy, the court noted that any adjudica-
tion would have required an inquiry into the activities of the for-
eign sovereign which could only be "fissiparous, hindering or
4. 168 U.S. 250 (1897). In Underhil, the Supreme Court stated that: "Every sovereign
state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of
one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within
its own territory." Id. at 252.
5. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
6. Id. at 423.
7. Id. at 428.
8. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977).
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embarrassing to the conduct of foreign relations which [was] the
very reason underlying the policy of judicial abstention expressed
in the doctrine."9 The court failed to observe, however, that the act
of state doctrine is a defense relating to the subject matter of a
dispute, to be invoked only after a determination has been made
that the court should exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction under
the United States antitrust laws.
Early antitrust litigation was confined almost exclusively to a
territorial jurisdictional analysis. One of the first antitrust cases,
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,10 established the rule
that .the Sherman Act would not apply to acts performed exclu-
sively outside of the United States. Shortly thereafter, however, in
Thomsen v. Cayser,1" the Supreme Court liberalized this rule of
strict territoriality by holding that a combination of common carri-
ers, although formed abroad, came within the purview of the Sher-
man Act, since "the combination affected the foreign commerce of
this country and was put into operation here."' 2
The concept of extraterritorial application of the antitrust
laws was firmly established in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America," where Judge Learned Hand adopted the "effects" test.
A finding of both an intent to affect and an effect on American
commerce brings extraterritorial activities within the ambit of the
Sherman Act. "
In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,'5 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals expanded the Alcoa "effects" test, advo-
cating the use of a balancing approach in determining the extent of
the extraterritorial jurisdiction under the antitrust laws.1" The
court noted that "[t]he act of state doctrine. . . demonstrates that
the judiciary is sometimes cognizant of the possible foreign impli-
cations of its actions," and that a "[slimilar awareness should be
extended to the general problems of extraterritoriality.' 7 The
court then identified the following considerations that should be
balanced in determining whether extraterritorial jurisdiction
9. Id. at 77.
10. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
11. 243 U.S. 66 (1917).
12. Id. at 88.
13. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
14. Id. at 444.
15. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
16. id. at 614.




The degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality
or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places
of business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by
either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative
significance of effects on the United States as compared with
those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to
harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such
effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of
conduct within the United States as compared with conduct
abroad."5
These factors were adopted in substantially the same form in
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corporation," which in-
volved a claim that a competitor had violated the antitrust laws by
fraudulently procuring foreign patents. The district court dis-
missed the complaint filed by one U.S. corporation against another
U.S. corporation on the ground that the "validity of the foreign
patents was to be determined by the courts of the respective issu-
ing nations," and that enjoining the plaintiff would violate the act
of state doctrine.20 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
district court's application of the act of state doctrine and re-
manded the case to determine whether, based on the factors set
forth by the court in Timberlane, extraterritorial jurisdiction
should be exercised.2 1 The circuit court concluded that "the grant-
ing of the patents per se, . . . is not the kind of governmental ac-
tion contemplated by the act of state doctrine, or its correlative,
foreign compulsion.1
22
In both Timberlane and Mannington Mills, judicial absten-
tion from adjudicating politically-sensitive disputes was addressed
as an extraterritorial jurisdiction issue rather than an act of state
doctrine issue. Nevertheless, the considerations involved in apply-
ing the act of state doctrine are quite similar to those involved in
determining whether to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction under
the antitrust laws.23
18. Id. at 614.
19. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). One significant factor which the Mannington Mills
court added to those enumerated in Timberlane, was the "possible effect upon foreign rela-
tions if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants relief." Id. at 1297-98.
20. Id. at 1290.
21. Id. at 1297.
22. Id. at 1294.
23. "[Tihe availability of the act of state defense hinges on policy considerations that
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Although the balancing test in Timberlane and Mannington
Mills was adopted in response to the growing awareness of the po-
tential and actual conflict of American antitrust laws with the laws
and policies of nations whose economic philosophies are frequently
drastically opposed to those of the United States, the test also en-
compasses act of state policy considerations. Indeed, one commen-
tator has suggested that when a determination is made under the
Timberlane test that the United States' interest in exercising anti-
trust jurisdiction outweighs foreign economic regulatory interests,
the act of state doctrine should not preclude application of United
States antitrust laws.2 4 In distinguishing between disputes involv-
ing the validity of foreign expropriation decrees, where judicial in-
volvement might interfere with the executive branch's efforts to se-
cure compensation, and private antitrust actions, this
commentator pointed out that "fears of affront carry less weight if
imposition of liability on a private defendant who has chosen to
disobey American antitrust law rather than command of a foreign
sovereign is at issue."2
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Clayco recognized that
Sabbatino called for a flexible balancing approach to the act of
state doctrine.26 Nevertheless, except for stating in conclusion that
"judicial scrutiny of sovereign decisions allocating the benefits of
oil development would embarrass the political branches of our gov-
ernment in the conduct of foreign policy,"2 7 the court failed to fol-
low the Sabbatino directive. It also made no attempt to substanti-
ate this assertion. Indeed, it is doubtful that a convincing
argument could have been made that judicial scrutiny would have
caused embarrassment, since all the facts surrounding the alleged
violations had already been publicized, and the acts of a United
States corporation, not those of the ruler of Umm Al Qaywayn,
are best accounted for by attention to the kinds of factors identified in Timberlane and
Mannington Mills." Sage International Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 435 F. Supp. 896, 905
(E.D. Mich. 1981). The court also noted that such an approach would be "in keeping with
Sabbatino's caution that there is no 'inflexible and all-encompassing rule.'" Id. at 905-06
(citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428).
24. Note, Foreign Sovereign Compulsion in American Antitrust Law, 33 STAN. L. REv.
131, 136 (1980).
25. Id.
26. 712 F.2d at 406. The court, citing Sabbatino, 379 U.S. at 428, declared that since
"the critical element is the potential for interference with our foreign relations, 'the less
important the implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker the justifica-
tion for exclusivity in the political branches.'"
27. 712 F.2d at 407.
19841
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were under attack. Instead, relying heavily on International Asso-
ciation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) v. OPEC,"5
the court chose to concentrate its analysis on a public/private in-
terest distinction-a distinction more firmly grounded in the the-
ory of sovereign immunity than in the act of state doctrine." This
is contrary to Sabbatino where the Supreme Court stated that the
"[act of state] doctrine is not compelled . . . by the inherent na-
ture of sovereign authority, as some of the earlier decisions seem to




The court in IAM v. OPEC refrained from actually applying
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Had it done so, 1AM could
have prevailed by showing that OPEC's price-fixing practices fell
within the commercial exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act of 1976.1 To prevent such a result, the court artfully in-
voked the act of state doctrine, which "remain[ed] available . . .
regardless of any commercial component of the activity in-
volved."s' Similarly, the court in Clayco skirted the argument that
a commercial exception should apply in the case before it. While
acknowledging that the Supreme Court had recognized an excep-
tion to an act of state defense for a sovereign's commercial activ-
ity,38 the Clayco court refused to apply the exception because it
characterized the granting of a concession to exploit natural re-
sources as an activity that "entails an exercise of powers peculiar
to a sovereign.""
28. 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
29. 712 F.2d at 406.
30. 376 U.S. at 421.
31. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 [hereinafter FSIAJ, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603,
1605 (1976). Section 1605 of the FSIA states that:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case-
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state, or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere, or
upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a com-
mercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect
in the United States.
Section 1603(d) defines a commercial activity as: [E]ither a regular course of commercial
conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activ-
ity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular
transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.
32. 649 F.2d at 1360.
33. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
34. 712 F.2d at 408.
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The court also rejected Clayco's argument that, because (1)
the actions involved in this case did not "include a sovereign policy
decision," ' and (2) examination of the motivation behind the sov-
ereign's act was less intrusive than an examination of its legal va-
lidity, 6 Occidental should not be shielded by the act of state doc-
trine. The court maintained that a sovereign policy decision was
involved based on the fact that the dispute here, as in Occidental
Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co." and Hunt v. Mobil Oil
Corporation, concerned a "sovereign decision authorizing exploita-
tion of important national resources." 8 The court also distin-
guished cases where an act of state defense did not preclude adju-
dication, such as Timberlane, Mannington Mills and Industrial
Investment Development Corp. v. Mitsui & Co. Ltd., 9 by classify-
ing them as cases in which "sovereign activity merely formed the
background to the dispute or in which the only governmental ac-
tions were the neutral application of the laws."'
The Clayco court, thus, concluded that it was precluded by
the act of state doctrine from scrutinizing any sovereign decision
involving natural resources.4 1 While this decision was, no doubt,
based on well-founded concerns for the sensitive nature of United
States foreign relations with oil producing nations, it also has the
adverse effect of "immunizing the conduct of private oil companies
who are able to implicate a foreign sovereign in their anticompeti-
tive schemes."' 2
The court also rejected Clayco's argument that the act of state
doctrine did not preclude judicial scrutiny of the sovereign's moti-
vation. The court acknowledged that in the case of Mitsui the mo-
tivation of the sovereign act had been subject to examination, but
it maintained that this was limited to an assessment of the plain-
tiff's damages and that adjudication in that case "would result in
no embarrassment to executive department action."' 3 In Clayco,
35. Id. at 406.
36. Id. at 407.
37. 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
38. 712 F.2d at 407.
39. 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979).
40. 712 F.2d at 406.
41. See, e.g., International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC,
649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977);
Occidental Petroleum Corporation v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
42. Backer, Sherman Act Jurisdiction and the Acts of Foreign Sovereigns, 77 COLUM.
L. REV. 1247, 1248 (1977).
43. 712 F.2d at 407.
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however, the basis of the claim was bribery of a government offi-
cial. Thus, the court reasoned, any inquiry into the sovereign's mo-
tivation would result in embarrassment."
The court failed to recognize, however, that such embarrass-
ment to a foreign sovereign or state is a proper judicial concern
only insofar as such embarrassment could "seriously interfere with
negotiations being carried on by the Executive Branch [which]
might prevent or render less favorable the terms of an agreement
that could otherwise be reached."4 In sum, the act of state doc-
trine commands judicial self-restraint when adjudication would
lead to any serious intermeddling by the judiciary with the execu-
tive branch's conduct of foreign policy.
Since the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), an
agency of the Executive, had already brought an action against Oc-
cidental alleging that it had violated the Securities Exchange Act
of 193446 by making illegal payments to the Petroleum Minister of
Umm Al Qaywayn, " there was no particular reason for the court to
have been concerned about embarrassing the Executive. Where the
Executive has exercised its prosecutorial discretion to bring an en-
forcement proceeding, any subsequent court action should not be
regarded as judicial interference with United States foreign policy.
The court's attempt to dismiss Clayco's arguments by indicating
that "the Payments Report and Source Memorandum disclose[d]
only some of the underlying facts and only raise[d] a question as to
the legality of some of the payments under Umm Al Qaywayn
law,"'48 is unconvincing. As the court in Sage Intern., Ltd. v. Cadil-
lac Gage Co. pointed out:
[S]ince the Act imposes criminal sanctions for bribery "for the
purpose of" improper influence or inducement, it is inconceiv-
able that a trial would proceed without some inquiry into
whether the alleged improper activity could have the intended
effect, an examination that will call into question the operations
of the foreign entity to which the bribe was allegedly directed.
The standards of proof in a criminal action, particularly with
respect to intent, would seem to require no less. Thus, in spirit
and in practice, the Act supports the notion that act of state
44. Id.
45. 376 U.S. at 432.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1983).
47. See supra note 1.
48. 712 F.2d at 409 n.6.
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concerns are subjugated to interests in stemming foreign corrupt
practices."
Finally, the court in Clayco rejected Clayco's argument that
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 19770 (FCPA) created an ex-
ception to the act of state doctrine. The court reasoned that en-
forcement action under the FCPA was intended as solely a public
action, with prosecutorial responsibility shared by the Justice De-
partment and the SEC, whose activities would be coordinated
with, and screened by, the State Department."1 It concluded that
the act of state doctrine remained necessary in private suits "to
protect the proper conduct of national foreign policy." 2
The Clayco decision is wrong and should not be followed by
49. 534 F. Supp. 896, at 910 n.26 (E.D. Mich. 1981). Also, as one commentator noted:
Clearly, any prosecution under the Act risks embarrassment of any foreign gov-
ernments involved, and may incur resentment for the imposition of American
moral judgments on their methods of doing business. However, Congress and the
President, by passing and signing the law, have determined, as a policy matter
that such risks are less troublesome than.the practices prohibited .... It would
seem that where the branches responsible for formulation of foreign policy have
subordinated the sensitivity of foreign governments to having their acts of a par-
ticular sort explored in American courts that, at least after a successful prosecu-
tion of the American concern, the act of state doctrine should not stand in the
way of the injured competitor's antitrust claim.
Becker, supra note 42, at 1261.
50. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 dd-1 et. seq. (1983). Section 78 dd-2, in pertinent part, states:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern, other than an issuer which is
subject to section 78dd-I of this title, or any officer, director, employee, or agent
of such domestic concern or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such
domestic concern, to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment of any money,
or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value
to-
(1) any foreign official for purposes of-
(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity,
including a decision to fail to perform his official functions; or
(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government
or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such gov-
ernment or instrumentality;
in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining business for or
with, or directing business to, any person.
Section 78dd-2(d)(3) states that:
The term "interstate commerce" means trade, commerce, transportation, or
communication among the several States, or between any foreign country and
any State or between any State and any place or ship outside thereof. Such term
includes the intrastate use of (A) a telephone or other interstate means of com-
munication or (B) any other interstate instrumentality.
51. 712 F.2d at 409.
52. Id.
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other courts. Conspicuously absent from the court's opinion was
any discussion of the extremely important policies underlying the
act of state doctrine and the extraterritorial application of the an-
titrust laws. The court disregarded Sabbatino's mandate that a
balancing test should be applied to determine whether the act of
state doctrine required judicial abstention. As a result, the court
provided a blanket immunization for Occidental's activities and
extended an open invitation to American corporations with inter-
national operations to disregard laws designed to curb corrupt
practices overseas. If reliance had been placed on the Timberlane
and Mannington Mills flexible jurisdictional test, a different, and
more logical, result would have been reached. Under a balancing
test, the United States' strong historic policy and interest favoring
antitrust enforcement, coupled with Congress's explicit condemna-
tion of overseas corrupt business practices, would have been ac-
corded significantly more weight than deference to a nation's self
interest in perpetuating anticompetitive and illicit behavior. It is
even unclear whether these activities were indeed condoned by the
rule of Umm Al Qaywayn or whether they were legitimately recog-
nized practices in that state.
Although the court's argument that the prosecution under the
FCPA is strictly reserved to the executive branch may be valid,
that should not have precluded the court from giving due defer-
ence to the Act's intent and purpose which views corporate bribery
as a threat to the "very stability of overseas business"' and to the
"public confidence in the integrity of the American business
system. "84
Once the executive branch, charged with responsibility for for-
eign policy, has demonstrated that it is willing to subject a foreign
state to possible embarrassment, the courts should feel free to
grant relief, otherwise unavailable, to an aggrieved party. Indeed, it
could be argued that the court's refusal to do so is, in and of itself,
an unwarranted judicial interference with the political branches'
foreign policy interests.
JANET E. RITENBAUGH
53. S. REP. No. 114, 95th CONG. 1ST SESS. 3, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4098, 4101.
54. Id.
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